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The Quantity and Quality of Teachers: 





We study the dynamics of the quantity and quality of teachers in the framework of dynamic 
general equilibrium OLG model. The quantity and quality are jointly set by a government 
agency wishing to maximize the quality of basic education per student while being bound by 
teachers’ collective bargaining agreement which equalizes teacher pay. Our model features 
two stages of education: basic and advanced (college), the latter being required of teachers. 
The cost of hiring teachers is influenced by the outside opportunities that college educated 
individuals have in the production sector. We show that this factor strengthens in the process 
of endogenous growth and moreover that it pushes the optimal trade-off between quantity and 
quality of teachers in the direction of the former. Namely, the number of teachers hired will 
grow over time while their relative quality (but not the absolute human capital attainment) 
will fall. This evolution of human capital accumulation is accompanied by increasing 
inequality, within the group of college educated workers in particular. Further, we consider 
the comparative dynamics effect of an exogenous skill biased technological change 
represented by a positive shock to productivity of the skilled workers, hence to the college 
premium. We show that this will exacerbate the negative trends in the quality of basic 
education in relation to GDP growth. Countering this trend would therefore require an 
increase in the share of GDP spent on basic education, assuming that the institutional setup of 
the school system remains unchanged. 
JEL Code: H52, I2, O4. 
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1. Introduction 
Increasing focus on “individual based instruction” continues to be one of the main education 
policy priorities in the United States as a means to raising education quality. This is evidenced by 
the dynamics of student-teacher ratio which has fallen from 25.8 in 1960 to 15.9 in 2003 (Digest 
for Education Statistics 2004, table 63). Research, however, has shown that students' test scores 
have not risen despite increased individualized instruction. This discrepancy has compelled 
policy makers and researchers to question the factors affecting students' test scores and the role 
of the quality of teachers vs. their quantity (see Hanushek et al (2005)). This paper develops a 
theoretical framework for analyzing this quantity-quality trade-off and offers an explanation to 
the observed trend biased in favor of quantity. 
Some of the changes in school inputs and students' test scores between 1955 and 2003 are 
displayed in Table 1. It shows that the decline in the student-teacher ratio was accompanied by 
declining relative teacher salaries while the overall K-12 public education expenditures have 




Another significant effect from changing education policy is the decline in the aptitude of 
teachers relative to educated workers. Hoxby and Andrews (2004) estimate that in 1963  41% of   3
all teachers were of the “middle” aptitude relative to their educated peers, with 17% above and 
42% below the average; in comparison, in 2000, 28% of all teachers were of the “middle” 
aptitude with 5% above and 67% below average. Corcoran et al (2002) provide similar results. 
Interestingly, student test scores have remained roughly constant despite the substantial growth 
in public education outlays. In the literature, much attention has focused on explaining how these 
different inputs in K-12 public school system have affected students' test scores. 
Many of the conflicting conclusions in the literature concerning the factors affecting 
student performance boil down to two general empirical strategies in the literature used to 
estimate the returns to quality and quantity of teachers. The first strategy attempts to estimate 
which teacher characteristics affect student achievement while partially controlling class size 
(see Aaronson (2007), Clotfelter (2007), Rivkin et al (2005), Goldhaber and Anthony (2007)). 
Class size is naturally constrained due to geographic and time proximities of the observations 
(teachers in the same state are under one mandated student-teacher ratio). The second empirical 
strategy aims to estimate how class size affects student achievement while attempting to control 
for teacher quality. Several studies which follow this strategy use data from policy experiments 
producing random assignment of students to smaller and larger classes. Then controlling for 
teacher quality this data yields unbiased estimates of the effects of class size on student 
achievement (see Angrist and Lavy (1999), Krueger and Whitmore, 2001, Krueger (1999), 
Jepsen and Rivkin (2002)). 
Using data from North Carolina, Clotfelter et al (2007) conclude that teacher experience, 
test scores and regular licensure all have greater positive effects on student achievement, whether 
compared to the effects of changes in class size or to the socioeconomic characteristics of 
students. Aaronson et al (2007) use the data on Chicago public high school students and teachers 
at the classroom level to estimate how teacher characteristics affect mathematics test scores. 
They find that replacing a teacher with another that is rated two standard deviations superior in 
quality can add 0.35 to 0.45 grade equivalents, or 30 to 40 percent of an average school year’s 
worth, to a student's math score performance. Goldhaber and Anthony (2007) also use the same 
North Carolina data to examine the effects of the National Board Certification process and find 
mixed evidence that improved observable teacher credentials have positive impact on student 
achievement. These results are similar to Rivkin et al (2005) who use the UTD Texas Schools 
Project. On the other hand, Angrist and Lavy (1999) use Israel’s class size maximum to estimate   4
class size effects on student achievement. They find that reducing class size causes significant 
and substantial increase in test scores for fourth and fifth graders, although not for third graders. 
Krueger (1999) analyzes data from Tennessee Project STAR to estimate the effects of class size 
reductions on student performance on standardized tests. His results indicate that students’ scores 
increase by four percentage points in the first year students attend smaller classes while in 
subsequent years the test scores grow by about one percentage point per year. Hanushek (1999) 
rebuts Krueger’s findings citing important design and implementation issues from the STAR 
project that suggest the returns to class size reduction are biased upwards. Krueger and 
Whitmore (2001) follow up on students who participated in the Tennessee STAR experiment and 
find that they had, on average, ACT scores of .13 standard deviations higher. 
Another approach is to use longitudinal data on declining class size. Card and Krueger 
(1992) find that a decrease in the pupil-teacher ratio from 30 to 25 is associated with a 0.4 
percentage point increase in the rate of return to education. Hoxby (2000), however, estimates 
that there is no effect from decreased class size on student achievement. These opposing 
estimates are addressed by Jepson and Rivkin (2002). They argue that using mandated class size 
reduction programs as natural experiments for estimating the class size effect is problematic 
when these changes involve a trade-off between the quantity and quality of teachers, and that the 
same problem arises when time series data is used without the account for this endogenous trade-
off. Specifically, their results indicate that California’s class size reduction program came at a 
cost of hiring lower quality teachers to staff additional classrooms which offset the benefits of 
smaller classes. Similarly, Hoxby (1996) also finds that school inputs can increase without gains 
to student achievement due to teachers’ unions reducing productivity enough to offset gains from 
lowered class sizes. 
Thus, despite a significant attention in the literature, the questions about the determinants 
of education quality remain open. This underscores the need for a broader theoretical framework, 
which would capture the dynamic interaction between different inputs in education as it is 
influenced by labor market in the production economy. We note in this regard a branch of recent 
literature which has studied how outside job market opportunities have affected the quality of 
teachers. Flyer and Rosen (1997) report that the three-fold increase in direct costs of education 
per student is attributable to the growing market opportunities for women. Hanushek and Rivkin 
(1997) document the decline in the earnings of women teachers relative to women in other   5
occupations and suggest that the expansion of alternative opportunities reduced teacher quality. 
Hanushek and Rivkin (2003) estimate that in 1955, 50% of all educated male workers earned less 
than male teachers, compared to 36% in 2000. Likewise, in 1955, 48% of all educated female 
workers earned less than female teachers compared to 29% in 2000. Similar analyses concerning  
the effect of the outside work opportunities on teacher quality are proposed in Goldhaber and Liu 
(2003), and Bacolad (2006). Lakdawalla (2006) demonstrates that a rising skill premium of 
educated workers due to faster technical change, coupled with low productivity growth of skilled 
teachers, has lead to lower teacher quality. The mechanism he highlights is the substitution of 
unskilled teachers for increasingly expensive skilled teachers. 
  In this paper we present a theoretical model which incorporates some of the factors of 
education quality discussed above, in a dynamic general equilibrium framework where 
government education policy decisions affect and are affected by individual education and 
employment decisions, whereas the dynamics of human capital accumulation and labor 
productivity has a feedback effect on both. In our model, the government agency wishes to 
maximize the quality of basic education per student and faces a trade-off between the quality and 
quantity of teachers to be hired. Furthermore, we assume that the agency is bound by teachers’ 
collective bargaining agreement which equalizes teacher pay. It is, indeed, well documented that 
teachers' unions significantly contribute to the wage compression phenomenon. Unions provide 
tenure to teachers and tie their salary primarily to experience rather than performance. 
Administrators wishing to hire higher quality teachers are forced by the unions to then provide 
matching raises to teachers across the board. 
1 Furthermore, the wage uniformity in public 
schools imposes similar wage rigidity on the private school teacher market (Lakdawalla, 2006). 
 
In our model, a government education agency has two policy variables: teacher salary, 
which is uniform according to the collective bargaining regime, and the number of teachers to be 
                                                             
1 It should be noted that unionization is not the sole explanation for the compression of teacher 
salaries. It is also due in part to the difficulty of measuring teacher productivity, especially in 
terms of educational value added given unobservable student characteristics. But even if such 
characteristics were observable, there still exists the challenge of determining criteria for 
performance based pay for teachers. For example, low ability students exhibit relatively low 
average gains in learning throughout the year, therefore an approach based on marginal 
improvement of students’ performance would not fairly compensate teachers for working with 
lower ability children.   6
hired.  The model features two stages of education: basic and advanced (college), the latter being 
required of teachers. College graduates can also take jobs in the skilled labor force of the 
production sector and get paid a competitive wage according to their human capital attainment. 
This opportunity cost implies that the level of teacher salary set by the government agency will 
determine the top quality (human capital level) of a teacher who can be hired at this salary. All 
college graduates whose human capital is below this level will be motivated to take a teaching 
job at the same salary. Therefore the number of teachers the government decides to hire along 
with the aforementioned top quality cut-off will determine the lowest human capital cut-off 
among teachers. Thus the total cost of hiring teachers is affected in our model by the outside 
opportunities available to skilled individuals in the production sector. We show, moreover, that 
in the process of endogenous growth this effect strengthens and that it pushes the optimal trade-
off between quantity and quality of teachers in the direction of the former. Namely, in the face of 
rising (over time) cost of highly able skilled workers the government agency will find it optimal 
to opt for increasing the number of teachers hired while reducing the overall relative quality of 
the pool of teachers. (The absolute human capital attainment of teachers, however, does rise 
along with the overall human capital accumulation, while sliding toward the lower tail of the 
distribution of college educated population.) Furthermore, we show that this human capital 
dynamics is characterized by increasing inequality within the group of college educated workers 
as well as between it and the unskilled. 
Thus this paper offers a theory explaining the trend in education policy in favor of lower 
student-teacher ratios (i.e., higher quantity of teachers) combined arguably with deteriorating 
teacher quality, despite growing per student schooling expenditures. We then build on these 
results to further analyze the impact of exogenous technological change biased toward skill, i.e. 
augmenting productivity of skilled workers and thereby the college premium. We show that this 
will exacerbate the negative trends in the quality of basic education in relation to GDP growth.  
Specifically, the comparative dynamics effect (relative to the benchmark trajectory) will be 
detrimental to the aggregate quality of teachers as well as to the quality of basic education, due to 
the upward shocks to the cost of skilled labor. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops a dynamic general equilibrium 
model with unionized public schools. Section 3 defines a competitive equilibrium, Section 4 
derives main results, and Section 5 concludes. Appendix 1 contains some of the more technical   7
the proofs.  Appendix 2 contains a glossary of notation.  
 
2.  The Model 
We develop a general equilibrium growth model of an economy populated by overlapping 
generations of individuals whose life consists of three periods: childhood, young adulthood, and 
old age. We identify a generation with the period when its members are young adults, thus the 
individuals born in period  1 t −  form a generation  t G . We assume that population size is constant 
in each generation  t G  and that it forms a continuum on the interval [ ] 0,1 . Let  (.) µ  be the 
induced Lebesgue measure on the set of generation  t G  individuals [ ] 0,1 , so that  ( ) [0,1] 1 µ =  for 
all t. 
Children make no decisions of their own and receive basic (or first stage) education 
which is provided publicly. Young adults are endowed with a unit of time and face an option of 
devoting a fixed fraction n of it to acquiring higher education (which we will also refer to as 
college or second stage education); the balance of time not spent on education is inelastically 
devoted to work. Specifically, the individuals without college education will work for the full 
unit of time in the “unskilled” production workforce. Those with college education either work 
for the remaining fraction of time 1 n −  in the “skilled” production workforce or, if qualified by 
the government, can work as public school teachers. Individuals derive income from work. They 
spend part of it on consumption when young and invest the rest to use the returns to finance their 
consumption in retirement, the last period of life. 
 
2.1. Production 
The production sector of the economy consists of private perfectly competitive firms producing a 
homogeneous capital/consumption good by means of a constant returns technology which uses 
three factors of production - physical capital as well as unskilled and skilled human capital. The 
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where  [0,1] α ∈ ,  0 D > , while Kt, 
u
t H , 
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t H  stand, respectively, for aggregate supply of physical 
capital, unskilled human capital, and skilled human capital employed in the production sector in   8
period  t. The coefficient  t θ  characterizes the net productivity augmentation of skilled human 
capital (adjusted for the shorter employment duration dues to the time spent in college) which is 
imbedded in technology. The sequence of {} tt o θ
∞
=  characterizing the evolution of the skill 




All individuals ω of generation  t G ,  0,1,2,... t =  have identical intertemporal preferences over 
consumption as young adults and retirees given by  
  ,, 1 ln ( ) ln ( ) tt tt cc ωβ ω + +  (2) 
subject to the life-time budget constraint 
 
1
,1 , 1 ()( 1 ) () ( 1 )() tt t tt t t cr c I ωω τ ω
−
++ ++ ≤−  (3) 
where  1 t r +  is the market interest rate,  () t I ω  is the individual’s wage income which is derived 
from human capital, while  t τ  is the uniform rate of labor income tax collected by the 
government. According to the production function (1) individuals working in the production 
economy receive the wage at competitive rates  t w  and  tt w θ , respectively, per unit of their 
unskilled or skilled human capital, whichever applies. Thus the income of individual ω who 
receives only basic education and attains the level of unskilled human capital  ()
u
t h ω  will be  
  () ()
uu
tt t Iw h ωω =  (4) 
The individual ω who obtains college education, attains the level of skilled human capital  ()
s
t h ω  
and is employed in the production sector will receive income 
  () ()
sy s
tt t t Iw h ωθ ω =  (5) 
College educated individuals who become teachers will receive income 
h
t I  to be specified later. 
 
2.3. Human Capital Formation 
The human capital received by each child ω of generation  t G  at the first (basic) stage of his 
education is produced in period  1 t −  by combining children's random innate ability with public 
                                                             
2 See Appendix 2 for the glossary of notation.   9
education,  1 t E − , according to 
  1 () ()
u
tt h Ca E ωω − =  (6) 
where C is a positive constant,  1 t E −  is a uniform quality of public schooling received by each 
child in period  1 t −  while  () a ω  is the child’s innate ability. We assume that innate ability is 
distributed independently and identically in each generation (the time indexation is thus omitted); 
specifically the distribution is uniform on the interval [, ] a A . To simplify the exposition (but at 
no cost to the substance of the matter) we will later let a = 0. 
We will now introduce the human capital production function for the advanced (college) 
stage of education. Consistent with Ben-Porath (1967) and Rosen (1976) we assume that the 
gains from college education depend on one’s prior preparation, which in turn depends on innate 
ability. Moreover, we assume that college education has a pre-requisite human capital threshold 
* h . Rather than an ad hoc admission requirement (we assume that all individuals are free to 
choose to go to college but base this decision purely on income considerations) we view this 
threshold as a set of benchmark skills, such as adequate language and mathematical proficiency 
whose deficit would preclude any benefit from learning at an advanced stage.
3  Specifically, we 
postulate that if an individual ω of generation  t G  chooses to go to college, he will become a 
“skilled” agent with the level of human capital given by 
 
* () () [ () ]
su u
tt t hb hB hh ωω ω =+ −  (7) 
where  (0,1) b∈  and B > 0 are given constants. Thus according to the expression (7) the gains 
from college education depend on the extent to which the individual’s pre-college human capital 
attainment  ()
u
t h ω  exceeds the threshold 
* h .  
  The college education production function (7) also reflects a partial loss of pre-college 
human capital, according to the coefficient b, for the purposes of skilled human capital. While 
                                                             
3  See Su (2004) for a similar approach to college eligibility. One can envision that this 
knowledge threshold may evolve over time with changes in learning technology. For example, it 
now tends to incorporate computer literacy; while applicants are not tested on it for admission 
decisions, their progress in many college specialties will critically depend on it.  For the purposes 
of our analysis  
* h  is assumed fixed. Note the important distinction between this knowledge 
threshold, which determines a student’s true performance, from the concept of an ad hoc 
admission threshold addressed in the “educational standards” literature, such as Betts (1998), i.e. 
an education policy variable that serves as a sorting device and employability signal.    10
this loss is counteracted by the net productivity augmentation  t θ  of skilled human capital 
according to the economy’s production function (1), we impose a condition 
  1 t bθ <  (8) 
which indeed implies that individuals whose pre-college human capital  ()
u
t h ω  is at or only 
slightly above the threshold 
* h  will not gain from attending college and therefore will not choose 
to do so. It is likewise logical to assume that highly able individuals, particularly those with the 
highest ability level A, will benefit from attending college.  According to equations (6) and (7) 
this will be true in generation   t G   iff the following inequality holds: 
( )
*
1 t bB C A E B h − +≥  
In Section 4 we will state specific parametric assumptions which in particular ensure that the 
above inequality does hold at all times.  
According to the expressions (6) and (7) human capital of each type, and therefore the 
corresponding income is an increasing function of the innate ability. Therefore if a certain 
individual decides to attend college then all agents with higher ability will also do so. Thus in 
each period t there is an ability cut-off level 
*
t a  such that an individual ω in generation t will 
choose to attend college if and only if his ability  () a ω  exceeds 
*
t a . (Without loss of generality 
we’ll make a convention that individuals with ability level on the threshold do choose to go to 
college.) 
Furthermore, we will later show that the college attendance ability cut-off level is given 

















which has a straightforward meaning: an individual will choose to attend college if and only if 
his resulting skilled human capital given by formula (7) adjusted for the net productivity 
augmentation  t θ  will exceed his unskilled human capital derived from the first stage of 
education according to its production function (6).  
  The non-linear form of the college human capital production function (7), combined with 
pre-college preparation given by (6), implies that individual’s advanced human capital 
attainment exhibits increasing returns to ability, for which the quality of basic publicly provided   11
education is a complementary input. This allows us to capture an important and arguably realistic 
property of “ability premium” of higher education: the skill upgrade that college education 
provides a highly able student is disproportionately larger than the one gained by a less able peer; 
furthermore, while higher quality of public basic education “lifts all boats”, more able students 
will derive disproportionately greater benefits from it. This “ability premium” argument is used 
in some of recent literature to explain the evidence of increasing dispersion of earnings. For 
example, Huggett et al. (2006) use a life-cycle framework with a multi-stage Ben-Porath type 
model of human capital accumulation, which exhibits increasing returns to ability at higher 
stages of education, to explain the evolution of wage dispersion in the U.S.  Another strand of 
models represented by Galor and Zeira (1993) is able to explain intergenerational persistence of 
inequality by the presence of credit constraints. The underlying mechanism, however, is 
fundamentally similar: the consequence of the borrowing constraints is that investment in 
education exhibits increasing returns to agents’ endowments (within a certain range).
4  Restuccia 
and Urrutia (2004) use a calibrated model which includes explicit early and college stages of 
education to apportion the factors, including individual ability and borrowing constraints, 
responsible for the intergenerational persistence of income inequality.  By contrast, in most 
models of public education, such as by Glomm and Ravikumar (1992), human capital 
accumulation exhibits decreasing returns to private inputs, which leads to vanishing relative 
variation of income.  
 
2.4. Quality of Basic Education 
We shall now introduce the per student basic education quality  t E , i.e. the public input in the 
basic education production function (6) provided in period  t, as a function of the quality and 
quantity of teachers chosen by a government agency. Recall that only college educated 
individuals are eligible to be employed as teachers. Let  t Σ  be the set of individuals ω in 
generation t employed as teachers. Let zt be the total number of teachers. Since population size 
was normalized to 1 in all generations, zt is also the fraction of teachers in the overall population 
                                                             
4 Heckman and Cunha (2007) and related recent work appear to provide a unified framework for 
these approaches.   12
in generation t, as well as the student-teacher ratio for generation  1 t +  students. We define the 
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= ∫ .  The explicit 
account for the heterogeneity of teachers’ human capital attainment is obviously an essential 
element of our model. Earlier papers, such as by Eckstein and Zilcha (1994), which explicitly 
modeled teacher human capital as an input in (compulsory) schooling, assumed that it equals to 
the average human capital of their generation. 
5   
  We now define the quality of basic education as a Cobb-Douglas function of the quantity 
and aggregate quality of teachers: 
  tt t Ez q
γν =  (10) 
Note that this formula corresponds to the one used by Tamura (2001) who assumed in particular 
that the role of personal instruction, i.e. that of teacher-student ratio, is more important for 
schooling effectiveness that the average quality of teachers, which in our formulation means that   
γν ≥ . 
  The special case of (10), when  1 γν ==  , i.e. 
  () ()
t
s




= ∫  (11) 
has a particularly straightforward interpretation. Assume that all teachers are perfectly sorted 
across classes, each class of equal size 
1
t z
− , so that each student through his classes is exposed to 
a cross-section of teachers which perfectly represents their distribution of quality. Then the 














= ∫  can be interpreted as per student 
average teacher quality. 
                                                             
5 Hatzor (2008) contrasts such regime where teachers are selected at random from the population 
with the one where the quality of teachers is determined endogenously with an optimal trade-off 
against their quantity. She focuses on comparing the implications of these regimes for growth 
and welfare in the framework of strategic interaction between education and budgeting 
authorities of the government.    13
2.5. Government 
The government funds and administers public education at the basic level with the goal of 
maximizing its quality  t E , as defined above, subject to the budget constraint given by the 
revenue from a uniform labor income tax at a flat rate  t τ . To these ends in each period t, the 
government must set teachers’ salary 
h
t I  and the number of teachers to be hired  t z . As discussed 
in the introduction, we postulate that the salary 
h
t I  received by all teachers in generational cohort 
t is uniform, according to a collective bargaining agreement. Since a college educated individual 
has an option to work in the production sector for a competitive wage as defined by the 
expression (6), the government’s choice of teacher salary 
h
t I  will uniquely determine the highest 
level of human capital attainment  t h among individuals who will choose to become teachers. 
Indeed it should satisfy the equation 6 
 
h
tt t t wh I θ =  (12) 
Thus all college graduates with human capital level  ()
s
t h ω  at or below  t h  will be obviously 
motivated to accept employment as a teacher rather than work in the production sector. However, 
the government’s goal to maximize the overall education quality for a set number of teachers  t z  
implies that the set  t Σ  of teachers the government will hire consists of all individuals whose 
level of human capital attained in college falls into the interval:  ()[,]
s
tt t h hh ω ∈ , where the 
minimum teacher qualification threshold  t h  is determined by the intended number of teachers, 
i.e. the measure 
  ( ) |( )
s
tt t t z hh h µω ω =≤ ≤  (13) 
where the top cut-off    t h  is determined, according to (12), by the teacher salary  
h
t I  set by the 
government.  
                                                             
6 Since one’s work career is summarily represented in our model by one time period, we do not 
model the wage dynamics over the course of a worker’s or teacher’s career as he accumulates 
seniority and experience. The appropriate understanding of the income variables in this 
framework is that they represent aggregates over the entire career, such as respective present 
values at the career’s outset. While teachers’ union collective bargaining agreements stipulate 
wage differentials based on seniority, equation (12) should be understood as the comparison of 
respective aggregates over the course of the alternative careers in question.   14
Recalling the production functions of basic and advanced education given, respectively, 
by the expressions (6) and (7), we define the cut-off innate ability levels  and tt aa  which 
characterize the teachers who possess, respectively, the cut-off levels of human capital 
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For the government policy choice of 
h
t I ,  t z , to be feasible, the minimum teacher 
qualification threshold  t h  defined by (13) obviously must belong the range of human capital 
levels attained by college graduates. In other words, the corresponding ability level  t a  must 
exceed the college attendance cut-off level 
*
t a . 
Thus according to (10) the government’s basic education quality optimization problem 

















where  t T  
 is the tax revenue collected by the government in period t. 
Thanks to our assumption of the uniform distribution of innate ability on the interval 
[, ] aA and due to the linearity of basic and advanced education production functions (6) and (7) 































and therefore problem (15) to maximize the quality of basic education  t E  subject to the 
government budget constraint can be restated as   15
 


















































  Note that the optimal minimum and maximum cut-off levels of teachers’ human capital 
are related through the optimal choice of their number  t z  according to equation (17). The 
optimization in problem (18) thus expresses the trade-off between the quantity and quality of 
teachers to be hired. The quality of the top teacher  t h  will not only determine his salary 
h
tt t t I wh θ =  due to his outside option as a skilled worker, but also set the identical salary for all 
other teachers according to the equal pay-based collective bargaining agreement. (Conversely, 
teacher salary 
h
t I  set by the government will uniquely determine the top teacher quality  t h .) 
Hence the total teachers’ wage bill  tt tt zw h θ in the government’s budget constraint. 











Therefore using relationships (14) to express  t h and  t h  and then eliminate  t a  according to 
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3.  General Equilibrium and Optimal Policy 
We can now summarize the fundamental elements of the model and their relationships in a 
general equilibrium framework. We will first define the dynamic general equilibrium for a given 
government policy parameters and then explore the government’s optimal determination of the 
quality of basic education. 
  Given the sequence of tax rates  0 {} tt τ
∞
=  and the sequence of government education policy 




= , i.e. teacher salaries and the numbers of teachers hired in each period, 
respectively, as well as the initial period  0 t =  aggregate supply of capital  0 K , the distributions 
of the retirees’ consumption levels  1,0() c ω − , and per students basic education quality 1 E−  
provided  to generation  0 G  individuals as children, we define the dynamic general equilibrium as 
a collection of sequences of 
(a) factor prices  10 {(1 ), , } tt t t t rw w θ
∞
+= +  respectively of physical, unskilled and skilled human 
capital as inputs in production in period t; 
(b) aggregate variables {}
*




ttt t t t YKH H TEa
∞
= , i.e., respectively, aggregate output, 
inputs of physical, unskilled and skilled human capital in production, government’s tax 
revenue, the quality of basic education provided to each student in period t, as well as the 
endogenous innate ability cut-off for college attendance; 
(c) distributions of individual consumption and education decisions 
{} , 0 ,1 () , () , () , ()
us
tt tt t t t cc hh ωω ω ω
= +
∞
, as well as employment decisions by college educated 
individuals  
such that   17
(i)  the factor prices are determined competitively, i.e. set equal to the marginal  products 
of respective inputs: 
1 1
1 1,  ( 1 )
us y us y
tt t t t t t t t t r DK H H w DK H H
αα αα αθ αθ
− − −
+ += + = − +      
(ii)  each individual  [0,1] ω ∈  in generation  t G  makes a decision whether to go to college 
and if so whether to be employed as a teacher or in the production sector so as to 
maximize his income while taking as given their basic education quality  1 t E − , 
production sector wage rates  t w  and  tt w θ  (for unskilled and skilled labor, 
respectively), teacher salary 
h
t I  and the number of teachers  t z  to be hired, whereas 
his human capital level  () o r ()
us
tt hh ωω  (depending on his college attendance 
decision) is determined according to the education production functions (6) and (7); 
(note that according to equation (12) and the collective bargaining agreement a 
teacher’s salary will exceed production sector wage for all but the top quality teacher, 
so the government teacher employment limit  t z  will bind;) 
(iii)  based on his income  () t I ω  determined according to (ii), each individual  [0,1] ω ∈  in 
generation  t G  makes his young- and old-age consumption decisions  ,, 1 () , () tt tt cc ωω +  
by solving the optimization problem (2)-(3) while taking the rates of interest  1 1 t r + +  
and tax  t τ  as given; 
(iv)  the quality of basic education  t E  provided to generation  1 t G +  individuals (as children) 
is determined by the expression (10) while the set of teachers  t Σ  is defined by 
individual employment decisions according to (ii) while the number of teachers hired 
t z  is as given; 
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=− ∫∫  ,   (24) 
where the ability cut-off for college attendance 
*
t a  is determined by individual college 
attendance decisions as defined in (ii); 
(vi)  the aggregate tax revenue is composed of labor income taxes collected from all 
categories of employees, i.e. 
( )
us y h
tt t t t t t t t Tw H w H z I τθ =+ +  (25) 
 
We can now define the government’s optimal education policy in period t recursively, 
based on the above general equilibrium construct. Namely, the government chooses teacher 
salaries 
h
t I  and the numbers of teachers t z  for period t by solving the optimization problem (18) 
(or, equivalently, the problem (20)) where the top teacher quality  t h  is determined by equation 
(12), while taking as given the economy’s general equilibrium values of production sector wage 
rate  t w , aggregate tax revenue  t T  and the distribution of skilled human capital attainment  ()
s
t h ω  
by generation  t G  individuals. 
Noting the mutual dependence of the general equilibrium variables in period t and the 
government’s optimal education policy we define the Education-Economy recursive dynamic 
equilibrium (RDE for brevity) as a fixed point of this relationship, recursively determined for 
each period t. 
 
Remark. Since we assumed that individuals make a decision whether to attend college solely on 
the basis of maximizing income, it is clear that the ability cut-off for college attendance 
*
t a  

















Indeed, according to (6), (7) and (4), (5), an individual with ability exceeding the right hand side 
of (26) will certainly increase his income by going to college. In fact, we will show in the next   19
section that in the RDE inequality (26) is satisfied as equality, i.e. equality (9) is true. 
 
4.  Analysis of the Model 
To reduce the unessential analytical complexity we will assume henceforth without any 
additional substantive loss of generality that parameter  0 a = , i.e. innate ability in each 
generation is distributed uniformly on the interval [0, ] A . We begin by analyzing the 
government’s optimal education policy problem equivalently stated as in (18) or (20). 
We impose the following restrictions on the economy’s parameters, where  1 E−  is an 
exogenously given per student basic education quality provided to generation  0 G  individuals. 
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  is true for 
any  0,1,... t =  
 





− , which of course imposes a requirement that  γ, the relative importance of the 
teacher-student ratio for schooling effectiveness, should not be substantially greater than ν, the 
relative importance of the teacher quality.  The main thrust of the assumptions, however, 
concerns the parameters which characterize educational gains. Assumption 1 is satisfied if 
parameter C  characterizing the gains in basic education is sufficiently large. Assumption 2 will 
hold if ( ) bB + , a productivity characteristic of the college education production function, is 
large enough.  
 
Based on these assumptions we will characterize the optimal solution of the education 
quality optimization problem in terms of the optimal number of teachers  t z  for period t, the 
corresponding range of teachers’ human capital, i.e. its maximum and minimum values  t h ,  t h    20
induced by the policy and the corresponding innate ability levels  , tt a a . In the process we will 
establish the following important facts (see Appendix 1 for the proofs): 
 
Lemma 1 (Growth of Basic Education Quality). The recursive equilibrium dynamics exhibits 
sustained growth of the quality of per student basic education. Specifically, there is a rate  1 g >  
such that  1 tt Eg E − >  is true for all 0,1,... t =  
 
Lemma 2 (The Interiority Property). In the recursive dynamic equilibrium, the ability of the 
least qualified teacher exceeds the college attendance cut-off ability in all time periods, i.e. 
*
t t aa >  is true for  0,1,... t = . Thereby the human capital of the least qualified teacher will not be 
the lowest among his contemporary college graduates. 
 
Lemma 3.  The ability cut-off for college attendance 
*

















which means that an individual will choose to attend college if and only if his resulting skilled 
human capital given by formula (7) adjusted for the net productivity augmentation  t θ  will exceed 
his unskilled human capital derived from the basic stage of education according to its production 
function (6). 
 
We now proceed to solving the optimization problem (20). 
According to the teacher salary equation (12) and the tax revenue formula (25), the 
government budget constraint can be stated as 
  ( ) ( ) 1
us y
tt t t t t t t zh H H τθ τ θ −= +  (27) 
Using the education production functions (6) and (7), and the assumption that innate ability is 
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 (29) 
Therefore expressing  t h  through  t a  according to the relationship in (14) we can rewrite the 
budget constraint (27) as 
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 (30) 
We now eliminate variables 
*
t a  and  t a  from (30) by substituting the value of 
*
t a  given by (9), 
based on the above Lemma 3, and using the expression  tt t a aA z =− , which follows from the 
relationship (19) since we set  0 a = . This immediately turns expression (30) into a linear 
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This expression incorporates the government budget constraint of problem (20). That problem’s 
objective function, upon substituting the expression (31) for  t a , becomes a function of a single 
variable  t z . We will solve for its unconstrained maximization and then refer to Lemma 2 which 
ensures that the only remaining constraint 
*
tt t a Az a −≥  in the government optimization problem 
(20) is automatically fulfilled. 
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Its first order necessary condition is given by the equation  
  ( )( )
11 1
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bB A C E bB bBA C E
θ τ γ
νγ τ θ − −




It is straightforward to verify that this solution also satisfies the second order sufficient condition 
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 (35) 
 
Observe that the education policy optimization as well as the individuals’ and the 
production sector’s general equilibrium reactions are determined recursively. Indeed, according 
to expressions (33) - (35), education quality  1 t E −  uniquely determines optimal education policy 
in period t, i.e. their number, as well as the range of their innate abilities and thereby due to (14) 
the range of their human capital attainment. This in turn will uniquely determine college 
attendance and employment decisions by generation t individuals, hence their incomes and their 
allocations. Government’s education policy will also determine the current period’s basic 
education quality  t E , so the recursion continues. 
 
Consider now the effect of the previous period’s education quality  1 t E −  on education 
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 (37)   23
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Therefore according to (33)   
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Thus the expression (38) will be negative as long as the inequality 
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  on the tax 
rate (see Appendix 1 for the proof  of this assertion).  Comparing expressions (38) and (39) one 











Combining these facts with Lemma 1, which shows that education quality  1 t E −  does in fact grow   24
over time, we obtain our central result. 
 
Theorem 1 (Dynamics of the Quantity and Quality of Teachers).  The recursive dynamic 
equilibrium (RDE) exhibits the following evolution of education policy variables:  
-  the quantity of teachers   t z  will grow over time; 
-  the relative quality of teachers characterized by the range of their innate abilities falls:  
both the upper and the lower thresholds   , tt a a  decrease over time; 
-  the college attendance ability-cut-off  
*
t a   also drops over time and (according to Lemma 
2) remains consistently below the lower ability threshold for teachers   t a . 
 
Recall that according to relationships (14) 
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This leads to the following  
 
Corollary.  As the relative quality of teachers falls over time in the RDE (according to the 
Theorem), the absolute quality of teachers characterized by their human capital attainment 
grows:  both the human capital of the top teacher and the least qualified one,  , tt hh  , increase 
over time. 
   25
Discussion. The intuition for the above results is based on the facts characterizing economic 
growth in our model. The growth of per student quality of basic education increases the   
opportunity to pursue higher education for an expanding group of students. Namely, college 
attendance becomes worthwhile for an ever broader group of students, adding on students with 
relatively low ability. At the same time, the human capital attainment of higher ability students 
increases disproportionately relative to their less able peers due to non-linearity in the college 
education production function (7). In other words, economic growth drives the rise of income 
inequality within the group of college educated individuals. As a result, hiring high ability 
individuals as teachers becomes a relatively more expensive option, which pushes the quality-
quantity trade-off in the education policy in favor of the latter. This argument is made explicit by 
the following result which characterizes the evolution of income inequality in our model. 
Based on the income formulas (4)-(5), the human capital accumulation formulas (6)-(7) 
and using the uniform distribution of abilities, as well as the formula (9) for the threshold ability 
between the groups, we can obtain the mean income of unskilled individuals: 
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and the mean income of the skilled (ignoring the distortion due to collective bargaining in the 
education sector): 
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Thus the inequality between the groups is given by 















== + − + 
This expression obviously increases in basic education quality, which according to Lemma 1 
rises over time. 
  The inequality within the skilled group (ignoring the aforementioned distortion) is 
characterized by 
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which also grows as basic education quality rises over time. One can rewrite this expression, 
according to (9), as 

















This demonstrates that the upward trend of the absolute disparity between the highest and lowest 
incomes of skilled workers can be attributed to two factors: (i) the rise of basic education quality 
1 t E −  which increases human capital and therefore incomes of all workers, but disproportionately 
more so at the high end of ability distribution; (ii) falling, according to Lemma 2, college 
attendance ability cut-off   which brings lower ability workers into the fold of the skilled hence 
increasing the intra-group inequality.  
We summarize the above results as 
 
Theorem 2 (The Evolution of Income Inequality).  The recursive equilibrium dynamics 
exhibits growing inequality within the group of skilled individuals, as well the increase in 
inequality between this group and the unskilled.   
 
As we discussed above and in Section 2, this result is due to the absolute growth of the quality of 
basic publicly provided education, which has unequal impact on individuals across the 
distribution of abilities because of the complementary relationship between individual ability and 
quality of education. 
7 
The recent growth literature which presents evidence of rising dispersion of incomes of 
skilled workers over the last decades attributes this to the skill biased nature of technological 
change (see Acemoglu (1998), (2000) and Galor & Moav (2000)). While our results have been 
derived from the impact of growing public provision of basic education without assuming a rise 
in skill premium  t θ ,  one should expect the latter to exacerbate the effect.  
                                                             
7 A somewhat similar argument for the magnifying effect that greater public education funding 
may have on income distribution is advanced by Glomm and Kaganovich (2003) in the presence 
of complementarity between public and parental private inputs, imperfect altruism and 
borrowing constraints. The fact of such complementary relationship and its implications for 
inequality was documented for the case of Britain by LeGrand (1982).   27
 
We will now introduce exogenous skill biased technological change into the model given 
by positive shocks to the skill premium coefficients  t θ  and will explore its effects on the   
education policy variables and the quality of education. Specifically, we consider the recursive 
dynamic equilibrium (RDE) corresponding to the original (benchmark) exogenously given 
sequence  {} tt o θ
∞
=  and assume that the productivity augmentation of skilled labor receives a 
positive shock from time  t0 on, i.e. that for  t = t0, t0+1, … the value  t θ  is replaced with some 
tt θθ ′> .  We will characterize the effect of this exogenous change on the RDE, particularly on the 
education policy variables. We obtain the following comparative dynamics result (see Appendix 
for the proof). 
 
Theorem 3 (The Effect of Skill Biased Technological Change).  Consider the comparative 
dynamics experiment described above where skill premium coefficients  t θ   receive a positive 
shock from period  t0  on.  The corresponding recursive dynamic equilibrium, relative to the 
benchmark RDE for t ≥ t0 , will be characterized by   
-  lower quantity of teachers   t z ; 
-  lower aggregate quality of teachers  qt  and therefore 
-  lower quality of basic education Et . 
 
Note the negative effect on both the number and aggregate quality of teachers which is 
due to an upward shock to the cost of skilled labor. The theorem thus shows that the 
technological change biased toward skilled labor will have a detrimental effect on the absolute 
quality of basic education, exacerbating the negative effect of a secular downward trend in the 
relative quality of teachers stated in Theorem 1.  These results will apply, in particular, when the 
education tax rate  τ  stays constant, which means that education budget remains a constant 
fraction of GDP, i.e. grows at the same rate. This leads to an important implication of our result 
that given the negative impact of rising skill premium on the quality of education, a policy aimed 
at neutralizing this effect would require an increase in funding of education (assuming no change 
in the institutional setup of the school system and teachers’ labor market) at a rate faster than   28
GDP growth, i.e. raising the fraction of GDP devoted to education.  A proper interpretation of 
this conclusion follows directly from our results: the relative cost of maintaining a given teacher 
quality standard will rise over time.    
 
5.  Conclusions 
Over the last forty years, education policy in the U.S. has changed significantly, focusing in 
particular on lowering the student-teacher ratio. We have developed a model which offers an 
insight into this evolution by relating it to the changes in the US economy characterized by rising 
skill premium and overall income inequality. We argue that teacher wage compression due in 
large part to collective bargaining agreements has a significant effect on decisions concerning 
quantity-quality trade-offs in hiring teachers. Our model predicts that as incomes rise and 
become more dispersed, education policy-makers are forced to adjust relative teacher salaries 
and thereby quality standards. Education quality is optimized by lowering relative quality of 
teachers while increasing their numbers. This causes the higher ability college educated people to 
choose private sector employment which offers higher reward to skilled workers.  
  We argue moreover that a rise in skill premium caused, in particular, by skill biased 
technological change will exacerbate the negative trends in the relative quality of education. 
Indeed, the labor of college graduates will further appreciate relative to the average wage and 
hence relative to the tax revenue. Countering this trend would therefore require an increase in the 
share of GDP spent on basic education, assuming that the institutional setup of the school system 
remains unchanged.  
  Our finding that skill biased technological change can have a negative effect on the 
quality of education is an interesting case of negative feedback, since SBTC literature points to 
the rise in the supply of skill due to growing availability of education as its underlying cause.  
Furthermore, this leads to an issue which appears important for future research on the aggregate 
long term effects of SBTC: as the technical change brings about productivity gains, one needs to 
factor in its effects on the cost and quality of education and the corresponding policy responses 
in order to assess the full long-term impact.   
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Appendix 1 
 
We will first prove Lemmas 1 and 2 under the hypothesis that Lemma 3 is correct. We will then 
prove that Lemma 3 is indeed correct in the recursive dynamic equilibrium, and thereby the 
imposition of the hypothesis will not have diminished the generality of (or create circularity 
problems with) the argument.   
 
Proof of Lemma 1. 
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 (41) 
Therefore we can write 
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Thus, in order to prove the Lemma it is sufficient to show that for all  0,1,... t =  
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which is indeed true according to Assumption 1 and by the induction argument.  
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Proof of Lemma 2. 
Based on Lemma 3 we use expression (9) for 
*
t a  . Then according to (35) our task of proving the 
inequality 
*
t t aa > . is equivalent to verifying the inequality 
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Upon substituting the expression (33) for  t z , the last inequality becomes 
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−− >          +− + +       
 
which is indeed true for all  0,1,... t =  according to Assumption 2 combined with Lemma 1.  
 
Proof of Lemma 3. 
The above proofs were based on the hypothesis that Lemma 3 is correct, i.e. that the ability cut-
off for college attendance 
*
t a  satisfies equality (9), i.e. we proved that if college attendance cut-















 then the optimal education policy requires that all teachers’ 
ability strictly exceed this threshold.. This in turn means that the marginal college graduate will 
be employed in the production sector. As we explained after stating equality (9), if an individual 
with ability below attended college his skilled human capital given adjusted for the net 
productivity augmentation  t θ  will be inferior to his unskilled human capital derived from the 
first stage of education, therefore a job in production sector’s skilled labor force would not 
compel such individual to attend college. Thus the only way the violation of Lemma 3 could 
occur is if such individual had an opportunity to be hired as a teacher. Compare, however,   35






























. One can easily see that the only difference would be a lower tax 
















. Thus the latter indeed characterizes the recursive dynamic 
equilibrium optimum, i.e. Lemma 3 is correct.  
 
Proof of inequality (41) 
We rewrite the inequality by squaring its both sides:  
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. This last inequality is certainly 
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Proof of Theorem 3. 
The proof will proceed by induction argument.  
Consider firstly the effect of a positive shock to coefficient  t θ   in period  t=t0  on 
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since we have assumed   0 a = . Using formula (34) we can rewrite the above as  
   () ( ) 2
1
1 t





=+                                 (46) 
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  We can now proceed to the next step of the induction and evaluate the effect born by the 
education policy variables in period  t=t0+1, keeping in mind two sources of this effect: the direct 
effect of higher value of  
0 1 t θ +  and the indirect one caused by lower education quality in the 
previous period  
0 t E  as established in (48). The results in (43), (47) and (48) show that the direct 
effects on the variables    11 1 ,, tt t z qE ++ +  in any period  t+1  of a contemporaneous rise in  1 t θ +  are 
negative. For the purposes of completing the induction argument it will therefore be sufficient to 
prove that a decline in  t E   will have a negative effect on   11 1 ,, tt t z qE + ++ , in other words that the 
derivatives of these variables with respect to   t E  are all positive.     37

























 , which according to Lemma 3 is equal to  
1* 1 t A a
− −   and therefore is 
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Rewriting expression (46) for period  t+1:   () ( ) 1 2
11
1 t






=+  , we note 
that a rise in   t E  affects   1 t q +  directly (obviously positively) as well as through   1 t z +  , i.e. also 









.  This combined with (49) 









. Thus according to the above discussion the theorem’s proof is 
complete.    38
Appendix 2 
 
Glossary of Mathematical Terms 
 
β   Discount factor in individual intertemporal preferences 
t τ   Labor income tax rate in period t 
t T   Total government revenue in period t 
a  Lower bound on innate ability, from Section 4 on a=0 is assumed 
A  Upper bound on innate ability 
() a ω   The innate ability of individual ω 
*
t a   Ability cut-off level for attending college in period t 
()
u
t h ω   Unskilled individual’s level of human capital in period t 
u
t H   Aggregate unskilled human capital in goods production in period t 
()
s
t h ω   Skilled individual’s level of human capital in period t 
s
t H   Aggregate skilled human capital in period t 
sy
t H   Aggregate skilled human capital in goods production in period t 
C   Productivity coefficient of compulsory basic education 
t E   Public education quality in period t 
b   Coefficient of in-college depreciation of pre-college human capital. 
B  Productivity coefficient of higher education 
* h   Human capital threshold for admission to college 
D  TFP coefficient in the goods production sector 
α   Physical capital income share in the goods production sector  
t θ   Productivity augmentation of skilled human capital (skill premium) in 
the production sector in period t 
γ   Returns to quantity of teachers 
ν   Returns to quality of teachers 
t Σ   Set of individuals employed as teachers in period t 
t z   Number of teachers (the share of teachers in the working population) in 
period t 
h
t I   Teacher’s salary in period t 
t a   The lowest ability level among teachers in period t 
t h   The lowest human capital level among teachers in period t 
t a   The highest ability level among teachers in period t 
t h   The highest human capital level among teachers in period t 
t q   Aggregate teacher quality in period t 
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